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Abstract 
Philippa Foot, like others of her philosophical generation, was much concerned with the status 
and authority of morality. How universal are its demands, and how dependent on the 
idiosyncrasies of individuals? In the early years of her career, she was persuaded that Kant and 
his twentieth-century followers had been wrong to insist on the centrality to morality of absolute 
and unconditionally binding moral imperatives. To that extent, she wrote, there was indeed 
‘an element of deception in the official line about morality’. In this paper, I shall explore her 
early alternative: a system of merely ‘hypothetical’ imperatives, imperatives that depend on the 
motivations of particular individuals. Could so contingent a system deserve to be termed a 
morality? How revisionary a proposal was this, and how serious its costs? And how might we 
reconcile ourselves to a morality stripped of what she called the ‘fictions’ that surrounded it? 
Foot’s early answer, tentative and exploratory, remains of interest, long after she herself 
abandoned it. 
 
 
 
 
[...] our freedom is not just a freedom to choose and act 
differently, it is also a freedom to think and believe differently, 
to see the world differently, to see the different configurations 
and describe them in different words. Moral differences can 
be differences of concept as well as differences of choice. A 
moral change shows in our vocabulary. How we see and 
describe the world is morals too [...] 
 
Iris Murdoch1 
 
 
 
1. Philippa Foot and the Amoralist 
 
‘It is often felt,’ wrote Philippa Foot in 1972, ‘even if obscurely, that there is an element of 
deception in the official line about morality.’2 The official line about morality – articulated in 
its most influential form by Kant – was that ‘moral judgements cannot be hypothetical 
imperatives’. That is to say, the ‘ought’ in a genuinely moral judgement is not conditional: if I 
think that a certain person ought, morally, not to lie, then I do not then have to follow that up 
with the many advantages to him of not lying. The idea is, I think, supposed to be a conceptual 
point about the moral ought. If we are conceiving of the oughts in our judgements to another 
person as distinctively moral, then, as Foot put it, ‘we do not have to back up what we say by 
 
1 Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature (London: Penguin Books, 
1999), 73. 
2 Philippa Foot, ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 167 
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considerations about his interests or his desires.’3 This, she said, had long been thought ‘an 
unquestionable truth’. Her influential paper ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ 
sought to show it was not: certainly not unquestionable, and very possibly not a truth.  
 
The nerve of the paper consisted in her unKantian proposal that we needn’t divide human 
motivation into what is done for the sake of the moral law and what is ‘merely’ selfish or 
hedonistic. Where would that leave those who does charitable things, ingenuously enough, 
because he cares about a particular someone who would benefit from the charity? Or those 
who are truthful out of love for truth, or just because they love liberty?4 Was it really such a 
problem that a person of this kind did these things ‘merely’ because he cared – about other 
people, or particular causes? Foot summarised the objection thus: ‘But what if he never cared 
about such things, or what if he ceased to care? Is it not the case that he ought to care?’5 
 
Moralists of the Kantian kind wanted, needed, to say yes: the mere fact that a person happened 
to care couldn’t be enough. There had to be a more basic demand to care, and one that applied, 
without exception, to everyone. A morality with room for exceptions seemed to leave the 
foundations of morality to the tender mercies of particular psychologies. It left room for the 
possibility that there were those who had no moral duties, because they didn’t care about the 
right things in the first place. It didn’t matter if there were such people. It would be enough to 
undermine the authority of morality were it admitted, in principle, that there might be. An 
exemption for some would amount to an amnesty for all. If I found the demands of morality 
onerous (as we all do at one point or another), it would be enough, for me to be freed from 
them, to stop caring, if I could, about the things that generated the demands in the first place.  
 
As she later clarified, Foot had not ‘wanted to reject morality itself’, only to expose ‘the fictions 
surrounding morality’.6 There could be a morality, and one still deserving the name, purified 
of these fictions, a morality based not on a universally binding and unconditional moral law, 
but on simple human solidarities. To those who feared ‘defection from the moral cause’, she 
urged that there wasn’t yet cause for panic. As she memorably concluded the essay in which 
she made this point, ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, ‘the people of 
Leningrad were not struck by the thought that only the contingent fact that other citizens shared 
their loyalty and devotion to the city stood between them and the Germans during the terrible 
year of the siege.’7 Her claim has the flavour of someone pointing out the painfully obvious. 
What a peculiar thing to worry about: that people who ‘thought of themselves as volunteers 
banded together to fight for liberty’ would be any less likely to stay the moral course than those 
‘persuaded by talk about the authority of the moral law.’8 Put that way, the traditional 
philosopher’s anxieties seemed absurd, almost the projection of a pathology: as if caring for 
other people were any less powerful a spur to morality than the rational recognition of the 
special authority of the moral law. 
 
Does this more modest thing deserve the name of morality? Foot couldn’t see why not, though 
she allowed that there might be those whose understanding of the word ‘morality’ simply ruled 
out such concession. On their view, if there is such a thing as morality, it is a system of 
categorical imperatives, unconditionally binding. But why adopt such a picture when there is 
 
3 Op. cit. note 2, 159. 
4 Op. cit. note 2, 165. 
5 Op. cit. note 2, 166. 
6 Op. cit. note 2, 174. 
7 Op. cit. note 2, 167; emphasis in original. 
8 Op. cit. note 2, 167. 
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another available, one that makes up for its loss of universality with a more realistic picture of 
human psychology? 
 
Foot would come in later life to reject her conclusions in this paper, even to rue them. She had, 
she later thought, been excessively optimistic. She had hoped that even on her picture of 
morality, one could explain that everyone ‘could have reason to do good actions and avoid bad 
ones, whatever one’s aims or desires’.9 But her friend and colleague Warren Quinn put it to 
her that she, like most philosophers, had been getting things back to front: ‘What would be so 
important about practical rationality if it could be rational to do despicable actions?’ She came 
to agree with him that she had been wrong to seek foundations for morality in a theory of 
practical reason. ‘One shouldn’t think that morality must pass the test of rationality, but rather 
that rationality must pass the test of morality.’10 The theory she came to embrace was in its 
essence Aristotelian: where she had, ‘brashly’, interpreted moral judgements as amounting, 
ultimately, to claims linking our actions to our desires, she came to think that ‘moral 
propositions are about the natural goodness of a human will.’11 Morality was grounded in a 
picture of natural goodness and defect: interpret our moral judgements as being about that, and 
morality is seen to have objective foundations of the sort Kant had sought, unconditional and 
binding. 
 
In a late interview, she describes her career as a slow movement away from the various forms 
of positivism that marked moral philosophy in her youth, views on which moral judgements 
amounted to little more than the expression of attitudes one tries to get other people to share. 
The central problem with such views, she later remarked, was that  
 
there is no way, if one takes this line, that one could imagine oneself saying to a Nazi, 
‘But we are right, and you are wrong’, with there being any substance to the statement. 
Faced with the Nazis, who felt they had been justified in doing what they did, there 
would simply be a stand-off. And I thought, ‘Morality just cannot be subjective in the 
way that different attitudes, like some aesthetic ones, or likes and dislikes, are subjective.’ 
The separation of descriptions from attitudes, or facts from values, that characterized 
the current moral philosophy [sc. 1950s] had to be bad philosophy.12  
 
Philosophers have been divided about the shift, with philosophers of a broadly Humean cast of 
mind disappointed that Foot abandoned the sensible subjectivism of her youth.13 Her mistake, 
as they would have it, was to see it as a problem that not everyone, on her early view, could have 
reason to do good things and avoid the bad. Or, what comes to the same thing, that she saw 
the possibility of a fully rational ‘amoralist’ – someone who denies ‘that he has any reason to 
trouble his head over this or any other moral demand’ – as a philosophical challenge to be 
overcome, rather than a fixed fact about human life that presents a practical hurdle to work 
around.  
 
2. Talking to and about the amoralist 
 
 
9 The quotation is from her interview with Alex Voorhoeve in Alex Voorhoeve, Conversations on Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 102. 
10 Op. cit. note 9, 102. 
11 Op. cit. note 9, 101; ‘brash’ is her word. 
12 Op. cit. not 9, 92. 
13 The phrase is from David Wiggins, ‘A Sensible Subjectivism?’, in Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), 185–215. 
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Foot’s career saw her adopt the full range of available positions with respect to the old question: 
why be moral? The ‘why’ in the question is naturally understood as a demand for a reason: 
what reason have I to be moral, to care about the good of others, and for their own sake rather 
than because caring about them may on occasion conduce to my own good? The basic 
structure of the question has the general structure of inquiry famously recommended by 
Descartes: one casts out any beliefs or attitudes that one has grounds for doubting, work 
backwards to what is indubitable, then work outward from the indubitable to reinstate those of 
our old beliefs and attitudes that we can now show to deserve to stand. However, to put it very 
briskly, morality is far from indubitable; its claims can and frequently are doubted, indeed 
resented. So, one asks, reasonably enough, for a reason to be moral. Now, the only thing one 
may not doubt when asking for reasons is rationality itself. To ask for a reason to be rational is, 
surely, already to concede the point, to presuppose the worth of that whose worth one purports 
to doubt. And so, rationality seems to provide an Archimedean point from which we hope, if 
we can, to provide that dubitable thing, morality, with foundations. 
 
This Cartesian procedure can be described in a less abstract, less solipsistic, way too. Reasons 
can be sought in isolation, but they are also demanded in encounters between people. Western 
philosophy’s original amoralist was just such a one: Plato has him appear in various guises, 
most famously, as Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachus in the Republic. Callicles and 
Thrasymachus are difficult figures, full of sound and fury, anxious to win in a contest with 
Socrates more than they are to discover the truth.14 Their aggressiveness makes them excellent 
guides to the human psychology surrounding the problem, if confusing guides to its basic 
structure. Plato’s best, and least emotive, attempt to illuminate the problem appears when 
Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic present the amoralist case as devil’s advocates. Being 
well-brought-up young men from a good (and prosperous) family, they remain within the world 
of morality – or, to put it less anachronistically, justice – and are genuinely moved by its 
demands, but would like Socrates nevertheless to vindicate those demands to a notional sceptic. 
In their mouths, our question ‘why be moral?’ appears as the question, ‘Is justice more than an 
instrumental good?’ Or, to put it more bluntly, ought we to be just even if – per impossibile – we 
might be unjust with impunity? Why be good if we can be bad and get away with it. 
 
The challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus is a challenge to Socrates: someone (pretending to 
be) outside the world of morality, but within the world of rationality, is inviting someone who 
is within the world of morality to make the case for being there. The ‘case’ must be an 
argument, a rational case. Appropriately given what is being argued for, no threats are allowed, 
nor rhetorical subterfuges. The argument is to be had out in the sun.  
 
The dramatisation of the argument – presenting the amoralist as a flesh-and-blood individual 
with a mind of his own, not as an intellectual spectre – has the considerable advantage of 
encouraging both moralist and amoralist to play fair in their arguments. If they cheat or falter, 
their opponents will notice. And this will mean that a victory for either side, or indeed a 
stalemate, counts for something. It can be a solace to moralists, or a further spur to the 
 
14 For a useful general discussion of these figures, see Rachel Barney, ‘Socrates’ Refutation of 
Thrasymachus’, in The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic, ed. Gerasimos Xenophon Santas (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 44–62; also, Bernard Williams, ‘Plato Against the Immoralist’, in The 
Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), 97–107. 
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scepticism of the amoralist. Moreover, it might show us something true, important yet non-
obvious about the possibilities and limits of reason itself.15  
 
This point was put elegantly in a book published in 1972, the same year as Foot’s paper. 
Bernard Williams wrote of the amoralist, in the opening pages of Morality: An Introduction to 
Ethics, that if ‘morality can be got off the ground rationally, then we ought to be able to get it 
off the ground in an argument against him’. The point wasn’t actually to persuade a real person 
of this kind: one may not exist, and any that do exist may be unwilling to listen, or too irrational 
to recognise the force of a decisive argument. Nevertheless, ‘it might seem a comfort to morality 
if there were reasons which, if he were rational, would persuade him.’16 
 
Williams’s formulation of the problem expresses, as he elsewhere put it in his remarks on Kant’s 
moral philosophy, a distinctly modern inflection on the ancient problem, ‘fed by real features 
of moral experience and by demands and hopes, dimly felt, for that experience to be coherent 
and honorable in the conditions of modernity’.17 The anxiety that morality might, some or all 
of the time, be what Thrasymachus thought it was, viz. another name for being a mug, is a real 
feature of human experience, brought on by what is surely a ubiquitous human fear: of being 
a dupe. But mere exhortations to see virtue as its own reward, in the style of a sermon, whether 
from priest or Socrates, will hardly do once doubt has set in. One wants more, a picture both 
‘coherent and honorable’, that is to say, an argument that can appeal to our (modern, post-
Enlightenment) sense of ourselves as, above all things, rational.18 If the rational amoralist is 
compelled, by rational principles he does – indeed, must – accept, to embrace the demands of 
morality, then those of us who accept those demands are far from beings mugs or dupes. We 
have, despite the tauntings of the Thrasymachuses of the world, been not credulous but rational 
all along. 
 
Like Foot in this period, Williams was pessimistic that the demand for such an argument could 
possibly be met on these terms. Even the best arguments against the amoralist, he thought, 
eventually committed the same fallacy: that of begging the question. To say that that amoralist 
is depraved, cruel, narcissistic or whatever, is to presuppose the legitimacy of the very moral 
categories he rejects. To say that the amoralist could not consistently will that everyone be an 
amoralist like him is very likely true (what could such a society even look like? could a 
community of amoralists even be a society?); but it is also dialectically irrelevant. The demand 
to ‘universalise’ one’s moral judgements, as Kant put it, is surely a demand that the amoralist 
can reject without obvious irrationality. Kant famously disputed this, but the contention that 
rationality requires universalisation needs arguing for and can hardly be simply assumed in this 
context.19 So what is left that might compel the perfectly rational amoralist to see the 
inescapability of morality?  
 
 
15 For a thorough and insightful introduction to the history of the problem, see Alison Hills, The Beloved 
Self: Morality and the Challenge From Egoism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
16 Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 
4. 
17 Bernard Williams, ‘Fictions, Philosophy, and Truth’, Profession, 1 January 2003, 40. 
18 This point about the modern self is put memorably, and satirically,  by William James in section VII 
of his lecture, ‘The Will to Believe’: ‘... he who says, “Better go without belief forever than believe a 
lie!” merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of 
many of his desires and fears, but this fear he slavishly obeys.’ 
19 For a classic (and underappreciated) discussion of these difficulties, see Don Locke, ‘The 
Trivializability of Universalizability’, The Philosophical Review 77, no. 1 (1968): 25–44. 
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Well, nothing. With quick enough footwork, the rational amoralist can dodge any 
argumentative bouncer the moralist hurls his way. But – and here Williams pointed to the silver 
lining – this wasn’t a particularly happy or comfortable place for the amoralist to be. For one 
thing, the amoralist couldn’t crow about his apparent invincibility, certainly not in any terms 
that were distinctively moral. He could not (truthfully, consistently) declare himself to be, for 
instance, courageous, a term that belongs to the world of morality that he rejects. So, he could 
not – to return to the cricketing metaphor – be got out, but nor could he score. The consistently 
amoralistic position is a dangerous place to be, every human encounter fraught with 
temptations to lapse into conventional morality. Morality (like society) is, in theory, escapable, 
but usually at a considerable cost. 
 
Having conceded the battle in its most philosophical form, Williams went on to claim back the 
lost moral territory as a problem in human life. What might a flesh-and-blood amoralist look 
like, he wondered – at any rate, an amoralist who is not simply a pathological case, a 
psychopath – who is real, but not typically an aspirational figure for those harbouring doubts 
about the authority of morality. ‘Some stereotype from a gangster movie might come to mind, 
of the ruthless and rather glamorous figure who cares about his mother, his child, even his 
mistress.’20 But to bring the mother, the child, the mistress on to the scene immediately disrupts 
the simple picture of pure, cold, egoistic rationality. To care for those particular other people 
– however little he cares for anybody else, however little he expresses that caring in terms of 
abstract moral considerations – suggests that ‘he has the notion of doing something for 
somebody, because that person needs something.’21 He is actuated to act, however 
‘intermittently and capriciously’, by the thought ‘“they need help”, not the thought “I like them 
and they need help”’.22 And to have this thought is already to have given up on the pure variety 
of amoralism: ‘there is no bottomless gulf between this [sc. the gangster’s] state and the basic 
dispositions of morality. [...] To get him to consider their situation seems rather an extension 
of his imagination and his understanding, than a discontinuous step onto something quite 
different, the “moral plane”.’ 
 
As Williams saw it, the philosopher’s original mistake had been to pick up a fight with the 
invincible (but spectral) opponent when there was a realistic and entirely vincible opponent to 
contend with. The pure rational amoralist is not a realistic alternative for anyone; the 
psychopath is not an attractive alternative; what that leaves us with is a not a sharp line between 
the moral and the amoral, but a spectrum of possibilities: from caring, somewhat unreliably, 
for the interests of particular others, to caring for the interests of everybody. The problem is 
not solved in its original form – so much is clear – but the problem has been replaced by 
another, more tractable but no less important. We are no longer anxious about what we might 
say to the imaginary amoralist, but rather what we might say about him, to each other. As he 
later put it, ‘The justification he [sc. the philosopher] is looking for is in fact designed for the 
people who are largely within the ethical world, and the aim of the discourse is not to deal with 
someone who probably will not listen to it, but to reassure, strengthen, and give insight to those 
who will.’23 As Williams described it, the audience for justifications of morality was not the 
amoralist pounding at the gates, but the amoralist within, that is to say, within us all. 
 
3. Mitigating the aporia 
 
20 Op. cit. note 16, 10. 
21 Op. cit. note 16, 11 
22 Op. cit. note 16, 11. 
23 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (With a Commentary on the Text by A. W. Moore), 
Reissue (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006/1985), 26 
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What shall we call such an argumentative strategy? The original hope had been, as we might 
put it, for a demonstration, a rational pathway from amoralism into morality. In panic at the 
difficulty of producing such a demonstration, we might be tempted into catastrophising, or into 
a gloomy or cynical embrace of the amoralist extreme. But both Williams and Foot seem to be 
proposing a middle way. There is space between these extremes for insisting, in a principled 
rather than desperate or defensive way, that the amoralist’s apparent victory is in fact pyrrhic. 
Call this strategy that of deflation, or better, mitigation.24 
 
Williams had credited Kant with conceiving, insightfully, of the challenge for the moral 
philosopher as that of showing that the central elements of moral experience could be coherent 
and honourable in the conditions of rationalism and scepticism characteristic of modernity. 
The catastrophising response, as I have called it, is that of conceding that the sense of an 
absolutely, unconditionally and universally binding moral obligation cannot be shown to be 
coherent or honourable under the sceptical gae. Incoherent because not consistent with a 
plausible theory of what reasons are and where they come from; dishonourable because to 
persist in living out a morality of categorical imperatives is an exercise in systematic (self-) 
deception.25 But as Foot tried to show, why take that element of moral experience – the 
categorical imperative – as the central element of moral experience, with which the whole 
caboodle must stand or fall?  
 
Strategies of this sort are often termed, in our contemporary philosophical demotic, as cases of 
‘biting the bullet’. The metaphor has something to commend it: the expression arises after all 
(my dictionary has it) ‘from the old custom of giving wounded soldiers a bullet to bite 
on when undergoing surgery without anaesthetic’. The gruesome metaphor may well be 
appropriate here: to find reasons to carry on living the moral life without the support of the 
categorical imperative exerts some of the same psychological pressures as must surely have 
afflicted Victorian church-goers in the throes of religious doubt. We need the bullet to bite on 
because the alternative, to put it no more dramatically than that, is to scream. 
  
But the phrase is also misleading to the extent that it suggests that the adoption of such 
‘mitigating’ views is supposed to count, at least a little, against the premises that led us to them. 
Neither Williams nor, in this period, Foot, seemed to think of their views in this way. To do so 
would be to treat Kant’s view of what is central to moral experience as authoritative, a fixed 
point in our theorising about morality. Foot and Williams prise that question – what, if 
anything, is essential to the experience of morality? – back open. They ask what in our moral 
experience actually stands in need of vindication. As Williams sees it, the answer could just as 
plausibly lie in a Humean conception of the sources of morality, not in the experience of 
categorical obligation but rather in the natural sympathy of human being for human being, a 
sympathy that can be extended, though who knows how far, and not necessarily by rational 
means. Should this come as a disappointment? Why should it, when after all, as every parent 
 
24 I borrow the term ‘mitigation’ from Tim Button, The Limits of Realism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 161 and passim, who uses it in connection with questions of metaphysical realism. 
25 Nietzche’s notorious remarks in Twilight of the Idols about English moral thinkers are relevant here: 
‘They have got rid of the Christian God, and now think that they have to hold on to Christian 
morality more than ever [...] In England, every time you take one small step towards emancipation 
from theology you have to reinvent yourself as a moral fanatic in the most awe-inspiring way.’ 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche: The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: And Other Writings, ed. 
Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 193–4. 
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(and teacher and therapist and politician) knows, changes of mind – or as we might more 
evocatively put it, changes of heart – are seldom induced by mere argument. 
 
Foot had, as we saw earlier, a different way of addressing the sense of disappointment a would-
be defender of morality might naturally feel at the modesty of the Humean conclusion. 
Disappointment and panic: ‘panic at the thought that we ourselves, or other people, might stop 
caring about the things we do care about’.26 The appeal of the categorical imperative consisted 
partly in its promise to give us ‘some control over the situation’.27 A crux of the many early 
modern debates between moral ‘rationalists’ and ‘sentimentalists’ was, after all, the question of 
whether an account of morality grounded in human sentiment provided it with far too 
contingent a grounding. It is to this old concern that Foot responds when she tells us, ‘it is 
interesting that the people of Leningrad were not similarly struck by the thought that only the 
contingent fact that other citizens shared their loyalty and devotion to the city stood between 
them and the Germans during the terrible years of the siege.’28 
 
The example sticks out conspicuously from the page and the philosophical literature in its 
historical specificity and vividness. But one may think it ill chosen. Even in 1972, the siege of 
Leningrad was remembered as Stalin and his successors had decreed it should be: a tale of 
innocents ennobled by the fortitude with which they bore the death, disease and starvation that 
the siege brought. But it has come to be known since the era of glasnost that the tribulations of 
the siege, like tribulations of other terrible wars, did not (simply) ennoble their victims. People 
were known to sell their bodies for an extra ration of sawdust-filled bread; the sufferings were 
by no means equally distributed among the population; 1,500 arrests were made for 
cannibalism. Diaries of survivors unearthed in Soviet archives have since shown that the 
ultimate effect of the severe malnutrition of those months was an extreme apathy. As one 
survivor put it, they began to exhibit ‘the indifference of the doomed’, just as much to those of 
their friends, neighbours and children as to their own. ‘The best way to survive’, one of them 
chillingly wrote, ‘was to draw an even tighter ring around oneself.’29 
 
Does the grim truth of the siege, rather than the Party-approved romance, put paid to Foot’s 
hopefulness? Does the behaviour of the Leningraders confirm what the rationalists have long 
said about the unwisdom of basing morality in human sentiments, sentiments so painfully apt 
to dissolve when the going gets tough?  It is not clear that it does. For one thing, it is a simple 
fallacy to infer from the fact that human beings do terrible things in terrible conditions to the 
conclusion that these terrible things show us something deep about what we are ‘really’ like.  
As Williams put it, it would be a sloppy ethologist indeed who based conclusions about the 
natural behaviour of lions, say, from their behaviour when caged and starved for weeks, and a 
poor physiologist who decided that human skin is ‘naturally’ like it is after exposure to twelve 
hours of blazing sun. ‘If someone says that if you want to see what men are really like, see them 
after they have been three weeks in a lifeboat, it is unclear why that is any better a maxim with 
regard to their motivations than it is with regard to their physical condition.’30 
 
 
26 Op. cit. note 2, 167. 
27 Op. cit. note 2, 167. 
28 Op. cit. note 2, 167. 
29 A harrowing recent work of scholarship on the siege, Alexis Peri, The War Within: Diaries from the Siege 
of Leningrad (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), recounts these stories and 
others yet worse. 
30 Op. cit, note 16, 9. 
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Moreover, as Foot might have urged, the rationalist can derive no comfort from these facts. If 
human sympathies gave out under such conditions, so did any consciousness of the authority 
of the categorical imperative. ‘Perhaps,’ Foot had memorably concluded, ‘we should be less 
troubled than we are by fear of defection from the moral cause; perhaps we should even have 
less reason to fear it if people thought of themselves as volunteers banded together to fight for 
liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression’.31 Volunteers, she had said, as 
opposed presumably to conscripts, a powerful redescription of the Kantian view in a manner 
that precisely invert its own self-conception. 
 
The sense of obligation, as Kant saw it, came from deeply within; that was why actions done 
from the motive of duty counted as ‘autonomous’, and therefore, possessed a special moral 
worth.32 Foot’s metaphor suggests that the sense of obligation could be experienced equally as 
a burden, an imposition from the outside, the voice of military recruiters pressganging the 
unwilling into service. Equally, actions done from natural sympathy could feel like the 
expression of what is mostly deeply one’s own. Moreover, if the question is about what can 
sustain motivation in tough times, than one might answer: if the volunteer spirit couldn’t survive 
the weakening of natural sympathies, it isn’t clear why it would have been any likelier to 
weather the weakening of the sense of obligation. The same sorts of circumstances, of pain, 
disease and starvation, are surely apt to weaken both to the same degree. More precisely, there 
seems no way to say, in advance and a priori, that the one source of motivation was any likelier 
to persist in extreme circumstances than the other. 
 
4. Styles of voluntarism 
 
The force of Foot’s strategy consists in good part in this feat of rhetorical redescription. Other 
moral philosophers in this period saw morality as, in some sense, voluntary, a matter not of 
vision or discovery or acknowledge but of choice.33 Jean-Paul Sartre, in his ‘Existentialism is a 
Humanism’, certainly took such a view; so, nearer home, did Foot’s colleague and the frequent 
target of her early critical papers in the 1950s, RM Hare. Hare, a survivor of the Siam ‘Death 
Railway’, had had a harrowing experience of the second World War, and his voluntarism had 
nothing flip or glib about it.34 The moral philosophy he developed from the late 1940s was an 
attempt to show the essence of morality to consist in the universalisability of moral judgements, 
a feature of the ‘logic’ of moral language, in particular, of the word ‘ought’.35 In endorsing a 
moral judgement, one could not be speaking only for oneself and one’s interests: to judge that 
someone ought, morally, to do something, was to judge that everyone similarly situated ought to 
do so as well.36 
 
The figure that haunted Hare’s philosophy was what he called the ‘fanatic’. The fanatic was 
someone whose principles met Hare’s every logical test – in short, that they could be 
 
31 Op. cit. note 2, 167. 
32 For a classic discussion, see Barbara Herman, ‘On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty’, 
The Philosophical Review 90, no. 3 (1981): 359–82. 
33 For a wide-ranging and profound discussion of the contrast and affinities between these ways of 
conceiving of morality, see Iris Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society: Dreams and Self-Knowledge Supplement no. 30 (1956): 32–58. 
34 See R. M. Hare, ‘A Philosophical Autobiography’, Utilitas 14, no. 3 (November 2002): 269–305, 
and Ved Mehta, Fly and the Fly-Bottle: Encounters with Contemporary British Intellectuals (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963), 46–57 and passim. 
35 See R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). 
36 See R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). 
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universalised without contradiction – but ended up with a worldview that was, to those who 
did not share it, repugnant. The logic of moral language by itself couldn’t stop a fanatical Nazi 
from thinking that to be Jewish was to deserve death. It couldn’t stop him from persisting in the 
belief even after being invited to consider that it was the merest accident of birth that made 
him a German and Gentile. ‘It is possible’, Hare said, ‘for a man to come sincerely to hold an 
ideal which requires that he himself should be sent to a gas chamber if a Jew.’ But this was not, 
he insisted, a reductio ad absurdum of the position that had led him to this conclusion. Rather, said 
Hare, ‘That is the price we have to pay for our freedom.’37 The freedom in question was the 
freedom to give ourselves an absurd, and self-destructive maxim: nothing in the nature of 
rationality could take away that freedom from us.  
 
Freedom, choice, decision, the will: these words gave to what presented itself as a detached 
theory, of what morality simply is, its characteristic mood of seriousness and tough-mindedness. 
The mention of freedom seems reminiscent of Foot’s insistence that there was nothing to regret 
or fear in moral commitment being a contingent matter. In both cases, reason and logic can 
only take us so far with the amoral or fanatical outliers. In both cases, the limits of rational 
argument are, at second if not first blush, not tragedies to be mourned. They are, rather, 
emancipations and opportunities, for the individual, and perhaps challenges to be tackled co-
operatively in society. But the mood in Foot is radically unlike that in Hare. Hare’s voluntarism 
is, above all, lonely, as befits a philosophy arrived at – as Hare reported –  in the loneliness of 
the prisoner-of-war camp.38 Foot’s argument for her voluntarism is not simply, as we might 
now say, metaethical. Her argument urges hat there is something to be said for her view about 
status of ethics from within ethics itself, from a particular ethical point of view.39 Foot’s 
voluntarism, while it lasted, was social, and the freedom she prized the freedom to see ourselves 
as social creatures, whose obligations are obligations to our fellow creatures, not to reason. Not 
me, alone with my conscience and rationality, but us – ‘banded together’, pursuing shared aims 
in tandem. Why does it matter that these aims are, as one might say, ‘merely’ contingent?  
 
That is not a merely rhetorical question. And Foot herself would come to worry that it did 
matter. On the voluntarist picture, she came to think, if those who had fought against the Nazis 
thought of themselves as in the right, tout court and not just by their own lights, there would be 
no ‘substance to the statement’. And the conceptual freedom it relied on opened up other, and 
disturbing, possibilities: that we might exercise that freedom to conceive of ourselves as outlaws 
fighting for injustice and unfreedom. The challenge for all subsequent moral philosophy has 
been precisely this: what grounds have we for hoping that people will not choose to conceive 
of themselves this way? What distinguishes our hope from mere optimism, or worse, 
complacency?  
 
 
37 Op. cit. note 34, 111. 
38 Op. cit. note 32. 
39 For an ingenious recent argument in this vein, see Max Khan Hayward, ‘Immoral Realism’, 
Philosophical Studies 176, no. 4 (2019): 897–914. Similarly, see these remarks by Amia Srinivasan, whose 
first sentence nicely echoes Foot’s own motivations for her adoption of a kind of ethical realism: 
‘Those who think that Realism is the only morally sound meta-ethics are often motivated by the belief 
that the most important thing is to be able to condemn atrocities as always and everywhere wrong. 
Anti-Realists prefer to think that people are ultimately answerable, not to abstract principles or divine 
commands, but to each other. We should take this view seriously [...] because it is ethically attractive 
in its own right.’ (Amia Srinivasan, ‘In the Long Cool Hour’, London Review of Books, 6 December 
2012.) 
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There may be no way of answering this question in advance. Williams and the young Foot put 
their hope in human beings, in the human ability to be led by natural sympathies to use their 
freedom in ways more, rather than less, conducive to many of the demands of morality. They 
thought a morality consisting in people answerable not to the moral law but to each other was 
morality enough. Like others who put their trust in human beings, they were taking a risk that 
brought with it the possibility of disappointment and catastrophe.40 It may be too early to say 
if they were misguided. 
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40 For a useful discussion of the growing pessimism in Williams’s thought on these matters, see Paul 
Sagar, ‘Minding the Gap: Bernard Williams and David Hume on Living an Ethical Life’, Journal of 
Moral Philosophy 11, no. 5 (24 September 2014): 615–38. 
